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ANDRE STEMMET*

The Influence of Recent Constitutional
Developments in South Africa on the
Relationship Between International
Law and Municipal Law
I. Introduction
The relationship between international law and South African municipal law
was traditionally determined by common law rules originating from English law.'
Until the implementation of a new South African Constitution on April 27, 1994,
there were no constitutional or legislative provisions in this regard. This traditional
situation in South African law corresponds with a widely accepted international
norm, namely that municipal law prevails over international legal rules. This
situation stems from the fact that states jealously guard their sovereignty.
The relationship between international law and the domestic law of a state is
important for several reasons. In view of the inadequate enforcement facilities
at the disposal of international law, the effectiveness of the implementation of
international legal rules depends greatly on the enforcement of such rules by
domestic courts. The status that international law enjoys in domestic legal systems
is largely determined by asking whether rules of international law are automatically incorporated into municipal law and, therefore, have direct effect on citizens
and the courts, or whether an act of transformation must first take place. The
*Andre Stemmet is currently a State Law Adviser (International Law) at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and holds a master's degree in international law from the University of
Pretoria. The views expressed in this article are the author's personal opinions and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
1. Rosalie P. Schaffer, The Inter-RelationshipBetween Public InternationalLaw and the Law
of South Africa: An Overview, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 277, 283 (1983); Gerhard Erasmus, The
Namibian Constitution and the Application of InternationalLaw, 15 S.AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW
81 (1989/1990).
2. See Schaffer, supra note 1, at 277.
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reception of international legal developments and human rights norms into municipal law also depends largely on the relationship between international and municipal law systems.
This article will briefly examine the traditional situation regarding the application of international law in South African law and evaluate the changes effected
to this traditional situation by the constitutional developments that took place in
South Africa in recent years.
II. The Traditional Relationship Between International Law and
South African Municipal Law
A.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

South African courts have been following the British example of taking judicial
notice of customary international law, in contrast to foreign law, which has to
be proved by means of expert evidence. 3 This rule of evidence is based on the
assumption that international law forms part of South African municipal law.
International law was applied by South African courts in a series of cases dating
to the previous century.4 However, it was only in a number of recent judgments
that the court stated explicitly that customary international law forms part of
South African law. 5 This has been confirmed by the Court of Appeals in Nduli
and Another v. Minister of Justice,6 holding that "it is obvious that international
law is to be regarded as part of our law." 7
In line with English law, the following exceptions to this general rule have
been identified by the courts:
1. Customary international law will not be applied if it is in conflict with
South African legislation (a logical result of the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty8). However, the effect of this rule may be softened as a result
of the likely existence in South African law of a rebuttable presumption
that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to international law.
In case of an ambiguous or vague statute, the courts will seek to apply a
meaning harmonious with international legal rules. 9

3. See South Ad. Islands Dev. Corp. v. Buchan, 1971 (1) SA 234 (K); S. v. Banda, 1989 (4)
SA 519 (B).
4. See Schaffer, supra note 1, at 297-308 (discussing a number of cases).
5. See S. v. Ramotse, unreported judgment of the Transvaal Provincial Division of Sept. 14,
1970; Parkin v. Gov't of the Republique Democratique du Congo,1971 (1) SA 259 (W).
6. 1978 (1) SA 893 (A).
7. See id. at 906.
8. See Schaffer, supra note 1, at 388; Erasmus, supra note 1, at 84.
9. See A.J.G.M. Sanders, Our State Cannot Speak with Two Voices, 88 S. AFR. L.J. 413

(1971). The existence of such a presumption has never been mooted before the South African courts.
However, this rule of construction has been firmly established in Commonwealth law, and it can
be accepted that South African law is consistent with Commonwealth law in this regard. See Schaffer,
supra note 1, at 285-86.
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2. In terms of the stare decisis rule, or the doctrine of precedent, courts are
bound by previous decisions of courts of final authority. 0 This has resulted
in courts sometimes applying international law not as it stood at that particular time, but rather the version enunciated by earlier judgments. However,
the South African courts softened the effect of this rule by a flexible interpretation thereof. In the cases of Interscience Research and Development Services (Pty)Ltd. v. RepublicaPopularde Mozambiquet" and KaffrariaProperty Co (Pty)Ltd. v. Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2 an approach
was followed similar to that enunciated in the English case Trendtex Trading
Corporationv. CentralBank of Nigeria,13 in which Lord Denning said the
following about the stare decisis rule: "[it] does not prevent a court from
applying a rule that did not exist when an earlier decision was made if the
new rule
has had the effect in international law of extinguishing the old
14
rule.'
In terms of the common law Act of State doctrine, the conduct of foreign
affairs is the prerogative of the executive branch of government, and the courts
should not interfere in the execution of foreign policy. 15 In practice this means
that the courts will accept a statement of the executive on a matter relating to
the conduct of foreign relations as conclusive, instead of taking evidence. As a
result, the application of rules of international law may be excluded. The courts
will therefore accept as conclusive a statement of fact pertaining to a specific
issue by the Department of Foreign Affairs' 6-usually referred to as an "executive
certificate." ' 7
The above-mentioned judgments have clarified the traditional relationship between international law and South African law to a large degree and are cited
as support for the theory that international law is automatically incorporated into

10. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 89.
11. 1980 (2) SA 111 (T).
12. 1980 (2) SA 709 (E).
13. 1977 QB 529 (CA).
14. Id. at 588.
15. The generally accepted meaning of the Act of State doctrine in the British common law
tradition, which was inherited by South Africa, is that of the separation of powers between the
executive and the judiciary: the courts accept the absolute discretion of the executive to declare upon
factual situations relating to the conduct of foreign relations even if such declaration may contradict
existing rules of international law. See J. G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 77
(4th ed. 1984). In the United States, three separate doctrines of Act of State can be distinguished:
the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine, and what
is called the Act of State doctrine that was defined as follows by the U.S. Supreme Court in W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 490 (1990): "The act of
state doctrine . . . merely requires that ... the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." Id.
16. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 89.
17. In South Africa, executive certificates have been issued pertaining to the recognition of a
state and of a government. See S. v. Devoy, 1971 (3) SA 899 (AD).
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municipal law, as opposed to the theory of transformation. 8 However, if the
exceptions to the general rule of automatic incorporation of international law
into South African law are taken into account, it appears that the theory of incorporation is applied in a somewhat diluted form in South African law.t 9
Two additional qualifications for the incorporation of international law in South
African law may have been set in the Nduli case: "according to our law only
such rules of international law are to be recorded as part of our law as are either
universally recognized or have received the assent of this country." 20 Although
these two additional qualifications were set in what was clearly an obiter remark, 21
they may have served, through the application of the stare decisis doctrine, to
introduce uncertainty as to the limits of application of international law in South
African law. These qualifications are unique, and the court did not attempt to
elucidate on them.

B.

TREATIES

The position in South African law with regard to treaties was clear: the signing,
ratification, and other stages of treaty-making constituted an executive act, while
legislative intervention was required for the incorporation of treaties into municipal law.22 The philosophy of separation of powers underlies this position with
the aim being to prevent the executive from legislating without the legislature.23
III. The Impact of the Interim Constitution, 1993, and the Final
Constitution, 1996, on the Relationship Between International Law
and South African Municipal Law
After the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African
Communist Party (SACP), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and other liberation movements in February 1990, a lengthy process of negotiations ensued among
these liberation movements, the National Party (NP) government, and other organizations in order to draw up a new constitution for South Africa. The government
and the organizations supporting it held the view that a final constitution should

18. The theory of transformation requires that each rule of international law has to be transformed
by the municipal legal order before it can find application in municipal law. See Erasmus, supra

note 1, at 89; A.J.G.M. Sanders, The Applicability ofCustomary InternationalLaw in South African
Law-the Appeal Court Has Spoken, 11 COMP. & INT'L L. OF S. AFR. 198, 199 (1978).
19. See John Dugard, InternationalLaw is Part of Our Law, 88 S. AFR. L.J. 13, 15 (1971),
for an argument in support of the so-called theory of harmonization.
20. 1978 (1) SA 893, 899 (A).
21. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 81.
22. N.M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (4th ed. 1986).

23. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 91; Sanders, supra note 9, at 413; HERCuLES BOOYSEN,
VOLKEREG EN SY VERHOUDING TOT SUID-AFRIKAANSE RE( 68 (1989); Pan Am. World Airways

Inc. v. S. Afr. Fire and Accident Ins. Co. Ltd., 1965 (3) SA 150 (A).
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be negotiated and implemented before the country's first-ever free elections took
place. The ANC and its allies, assured of the support of the majority of first
time black voters, argued that the elections should take place first and that the
Parliament so elected could then act as a Constitutional Assembly to negotiate
and enact a final constitution. In the end, an historic compromise was made: it
was agreed than an interim constitution, to be valid for a period of five years,
would be negotiated and implemented at the time of the election. The newly
elected Parliament, sitting as a Constitutional Assembly, could then negotiate a
final constitution. The constitution for the interim period was approved by the
South African Parliament on December 22, 1993,24 and came into force on April
27, 1994, the first day of the election. The Interim Constitution provided, inter
alia, that the text of the Final Constitution had to comply with thirty-four Constitutional Principles,25 and that the Constitutional Court had to certify that all the
provisions of the text of the Final Constitution complied with the Constitutional
Principles.26
Section 4(1) of the Interim Constitution provides that it shall be the supreme
law of the country, and that any law or act, by any of the branches of government
inconsistent with its provisions, shall be of no force and effect to the extent of
the inconsistency. It further provides that the courts will have the power to test
the validity of any act of government for legality and legitimacy.27 A Constitutional
Court, the first in the history of the Republic, was established as the court of
final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection, and enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution.28
Furthermore, a chapter on fundamental rights was enacted in the Interim Constitution.29 It included a number of traditional civil and political rights such as:
(1) the right to equality before the law and non-discrimination, (2) the righht to
life; (3) freedom of religion; (4) freedom of belief, opinion, and expression;
(5) freedom of assembly, demonstration, and petition; and (6) freedom of association, movement, and residence. Also, the rights of detainees are guaranteed, and
a number of economic, social, and cultural rights are enunciated.
The implementation of the Interim Constitution opened a new chapter in
the political and legal history of South Africa, turning it into a democratic,
constitutional state. The supremacy of the Constitution is in direct contrast
to the previous system of administration, which was based on the British

24. Act 200 of 1993, S. Aim. INTERIM CONST. (1994).
25. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 71(l)(a). The thirty-four Principles are listed in Schedule
4.
26. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 7(2).
27. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 98-103.
28. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 98(1).
29. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. §§ 7-35.
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Westminster system3 of government in terms of which Parliament was sovereign
and above the law.
A Final Constitution for the Republic was negotiated by the Constitutional
Assembly during 1995 and 1996, and was approved by Parliament sitting as the
Constitutional Assembly on May 8, 1996. The Constitutional Court referred it
back to the Constitutional Assembly as some provisions, notably those dealing
with the powers of the provinces, did not meet the requirements set in the Constitutional Principles. After the Constitutional Assembly made the required amendments, the Constitutional Court duly certified it and it was enacted into law by
Parliament on December 18, 199631 and implemented on February 4, 1997.32
As far as the supremacy of the Constitution and the Constitutional protection of
human rights are concerned, the same values underlie the Final Constitution as
the Interim Constitution.

The Interim Constitution also broke new ground in that, for the first time, international law was incorporated into South African law by means of a statute. The Final
Constitution also makes provision for such incorporation, although some provisions dealing with this matter differ substantially from those in the Interim Constitution. The following is a survey of the role accorded to international law in the South
African municipal law system by the respective Constitutions. As litigation is still
taking place in South African courts regarding terms of the Interim Constitution,
its provisions will remain of relevance for some time to come.
A.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. The Interim Constitution
Section 231(4) of the Interim Constitution deals with the status accorded to
customary international law in South African law and reads as follows: "The
rules of customary international law binding on the Republic, shall, unless inconsistent with this3 4Constitution or an Act of Parliament, form part of the law of
the Republic.'
It can be argued that the formulation "rules of customary international law"
is somewhat narrower than "general rules of public international law," which
is found in the Namibian Constitution35 and the German Constitution ("die allgem30. See J.C. Sonnekus, South Africa's Transition to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 29 INT'L
LAW. 659, 661 (1995); Anton J. Steenkamp, The South African Constitution of 1993 and the Bill
of Rights: An Evaluation in the Light of International Human Rights Norms, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 101,
102 (1995).
31. Act No. 108, CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) (Final Constitution).
32. See Proclamation No. R.6 of 1997, in Gov'T GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 1997. It proclaims that
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was to be implemented on February 4, 1997, except
for § 160(l)(b) for which the date of implementation was set as June 30, 1997.
33. This is clear from a number of the Constitutional Principles listed in Schedule 4 of the Interim
Constitution with which the Final Constitution had to comply, notably principles il-IX.
34. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 231(4).
35. NAMIB. CONST. (1990) § 144.
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eine regeln des V61kerrechts").a6 Erasmus, with reference to the Namibian Constitution, makes a convincing argument that the Namibian formulation is wider
than "customary international law," and that it also includes regional and particular international law,37 while the formulation of "customary international law"
will be limited to such rules as have received world-wide acceptance. 3' A southern
African or African custom would therefore not constitute an international legal
obligation for South Africa in terms of the Interim Constitution. The formulation
in the Interim Constitution would also exclude the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" 39 that are referred to in article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, while the Namibian and German formulations
would include such principles.
The phrase "binding on the Republic" is a somewhat unfortunate formulation.
It is a clear principle of international law that a state is not bound by rules of
international law against which it has persistently objected. Therefore, the reason
for the inclusion of this phrase could hardly have been to make this principle
applicable in South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa will be bound by
rules of customary international law once the criteria set by international law
itself have been satisfied, as no act of incorporation is required. This formulation
thus cannot serve to exclude the applicability of such rules in South African
municipal law. It may well be argued that this formulation only creates confusion
and interpretation problems.
The provision that customary international law shall only form part of South
African municipal law as far as it is not inconsistent with the Interim Constitution
and Parliamentary acts corresponds with a similar provision in the Namibian
constitution.40 The effect of this provision is that the common law doctrine, in
terms of which the incorporation of international law into South Africa law could
be excluded by legislation, was given constitutional status. It follows logically
that the presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to
international law will still be the principle guiding the courts.
It may be argued that the provision that customary international law can be
excluded from South African law by acts of Parliament will serve to perpetuate
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty within the South African system of
constitutional government and that the German approach in this regard should
have been followed. Section 25 of the Grundgesetz provides that international
36. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [66] § 25 (F.R.G.).
37. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 98.
38. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1990) for support of
this view, and M. Olivier, The Status of InternationalLaw in South African MunicipalLaw: Section
231 of the 1993 Constitution, 19 S. AFR. Y.B. OF INT'L LAW, 1, 11 (1993/94) for a view in support
of the present formulation of § 231(4).
39. "General principles of law" refers to the application of general legal principles found in
municipal jurisprudence and in international law insofar as such principles are applicable in the
relations between states. See VON MONCH, GRUNDGESETZKOMMMENTAR 140 (1983).

40. NAMIa. CONST. (1990) § 144.
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law shall take precedence over statutes of the federal as well as Lander governments, but not over provisions of the Grundgesetz. Furthermore, it provides
that international law will create rights and duties for inhabitants of the federal
territory.
The German approach is more effective for guaranteeing human rights. The
legislator is not able to exclude the application of international human rights
norms that have achieved the status of customary international law from municipal
law, while the direct applicability of international law on the individual will
enhance the effective protection of human rights. However, it is a moot point
whether such a formulation would in practice have resulted in a more effective
human rights regime in South African law. As they stand, both the Interim and
the Final Constitutions are virtual catalogues of rights based on internationallyaccepted human rights norms. A detailed evaluation 4' of the Bill of Rights contained in the Interim Constitution in the light of international human rights norms,
led to the conclusion that the Interim Constitution not only comports with such
norms, but in some formulations of human rights 42 even surpasses international
norms. It follows that the capacity of the legislator to exclude the application of
international human rights norms in South African law will probably amount
to virtually nothing. The same is true in view of the doctrines governing the
interpretation of legislation as well.
2. The Final Constitution
Sections 231-233 of the Final Constitution deal with international law. Section
231 deals with international agreements and section 232 with customary interna43
tional law, while section 233 has the title "Application of international law."
Section 232 reads: "Customary international law is law in the Republic unless
it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament."44
It will be noticed that the formulation, "customary international law," was
preferred instead of the Interim Constitution's formulation, "rules of customary
international law. " It is submitted that no change in meaning or scope of application have been brought about as a result of the omission of the word "rules."
For the reasons set out above, it is also to be welcomed that the formulation
"binding on the Republic" has been omitted from the final version of the article
dealing with customary international law. 45 The Interim Constitution's qualifica-

41. See Steenkamp, supra note 30.
42. Cf. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 8(1). The right not to be discriminated against on the ground
of sexual orientation is contained in § 8(1).
43. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) §§ 231-33.
44. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 232.
45. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 232. One of the reasons for these changes may
well be the Constitutional Assembly's commitment to simplify the text of the Final Constitution in
order to make it more "user friendly."
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tion on the automatic incorporation of customary international law, that it should
not be inconsistent with the Constitution or a parliamentary act, has been retained
in section 232 of the Final Constitution.
Section 233 provides that, in interpreting any legislation, every court "must
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. "46 The well-established common law presumption against Parliamentary intent to exclude the application of international law is given legislative status
for the first time. The question remains whether the stare decisis rule and the
Act of State doctrine, as well as the qualifications of "universal recognition"
and "assent" that were set in Nduli, 47 will still apply after the entering into force
of the Interim and Final Constitutions.
3. Stare Decisis
The Interim Constitution 8 provides that the Constitutional Court shall have
jurisdiction as the court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection, and enforcement of the constitution.49 In the Final Constitution
the powers and jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court are elaborated upon in

section 167. Section 167(3)(a) provides that the Constitutional Court is the highest
court in constitutional matters. 50 Other courts will therefore be bound by the
interpretation of the Constitutional Court of the sections in both the Interim and
Final Constitutions dealing with international law. The stare decisis rule will in
this way find application in the new constitutional system.
However, no provision of either the Interim or Final Constitutions dealing
with international law lends itself to an interpretation that will prevent the Constitutional Court from applying international law as it stands at that particular time.
Rather, it will mitigate against an application of the stare decisis rule that would
prevent the incorporation of contemporary international law.

46. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 232.
47. 1978 (1) SA 893(A).
48. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 98 (2).
49. For elucidation of the role of different courts to adjudicate in constitutional matters in terms
of the Interim Constitution, see Sonnekus, supra note 30, at 670-74. To summarize, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court was denied jurisdiction to adjudicate in any matter within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. S. APR. INTERIM CONST. § 10 1(5). Provincial and local divisions
of the Supreme Court, however, have jurisdiction over a number of constitutional matters elaborated
in § 101(3)-(4). Lower courts have no jurisdiction in constitutional matters. S. AIR. INTERIM CONST.

§ 101.
50. In the Final Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeal was accorded jurisdiction over
constitutional matters. CONST. OF THE REp. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 168(2). High Courts (as the Supreme
Courts have been renamed) will have jurisdiction in all constitutional matters except in cases where
the Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction, while lower courts remain without jurisdiction
in constitutional matters. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 167(4).
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4. The Act of State Doctrine
The clear demarcation of executive powers and the status of international
law in both the Interim and Final Constitutions5 have resulted in the demise
of prerogative powers and the Act of State doctrine.5 2 Any limitations on the
applicability of international law in South African municipal law thus will result
only from the provisions of the respective Constitutions.
5. The Nduli Requirements
As discussed earlier, the requirements of "universal recognition" and "assent" set obiter in Nduli 53 have only complicated the question of applicability
of international law in South African law. Regarding the continued applicability
of South African case law prior to April 27, 1994 (the implementation date of
the Interim Constitution), it is submitted that the same situation has applied in
South Africa as was the case in Namibia after that country's constitution of 1990
came into force. In this regard, the following remark by Erasmus is also applicable
to South Africa:
The problematical qualifications to the application of customary international law
added by the Nduli judgment of the South African Appellate Division would best be
ignored in Namibia. The Namibian Constitution is now the fons et origo for the rule
that international law is part of Namibia's law. South African case law, together with
that of other countries, is to be consulted only insofar as it is compatible with the
Grundnorm of Namibian law which is the Constitution.
The same philosophy will of course be applicable to the Final Constitution.
B.

TREATIES

1. The Interim Constitution
The provisions regarding treaties 55 contained in sections 231(t)-(3) of the Interim Constitution substantially alter the pre-constitutional position, and unfortunately also create some uncertainties. Section 231 (1) provides that all rights and

51. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. chs. 5-6.
52. See DION BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION 119 (Jo Goodwill ed., 1994).
The prerogatives and "Act of State" doctrine resulted from the "separation of powers" doctrine.
Concern has been expressed that, as the president has not been expressly empowered to recognise
foreign states and governments in § 82(1) of the Interim Constitution (dealing with presidential
powers), the courts will be put in a position to pass judgment on these matters-an undesirable
situation. See John Dugard, InternationalLaw and the 'Final' Constitution, 11 S. AFR. J. ON HUM.
RTS. 241, 247 (1995). As no such powers were ascribed to the President in § 78(3) of the Final
Constitution, the same concern is applicable. See also Hercules Booysen, Has the Act of State Doctrine
Survived the 1993 Interim Constitution?, 20 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 189 (1995) (discussing a viewpoint
that the Act of State doctrine has been curtailed by the Interim Constitution in the sense that it has
become justifiable in terms of international law).
53. 1978 (1) SA 893(A).
54. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 99-100.
55. These are referred to as "international agreements" in the text.
VOL. 33, NO. 1
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obligations under international agreements that were vested in or binding on the
Republic in terms of its previous Constitution, shall remain vested in and binding
on it in terms of the Interim Constitution, unless provided otherwise by an act
of Parliament.
The formulation of section 231(1) is that of a classical succession provision,
although the first democratic election in South Africa resulted only in a change
of government and not the creation of a new state entity.56
The provision that Parliament can legislate to terminate treaties entered into
by the previous government is problematical. 7 Any termination of a treaty that
is not effected in terms of specific termination clauses in such a treaty, or the
procedures laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969,
will in effect be a unilateral termination in breach of the Republic's obligations
under international law.5"
Sections 231 (1) and (2) govern agreements entered into after the implementation of the Interim Constitution. Section 231(2) provides, as was the case before
the implementation of the Interim Constitution, that international agreements are
to be negotiated and signed by the executive branch of government in terms of
section 82(l)(i),5 9 while Parliament is authorized to decide on the ratification of
or accession to international agreements. While this section deals with the procedure by which South Africa becomes a party to international agreements, section
231(3) deals with the incorporation thereof into municipal law. It provides that
"where Parliament agrees to the ratification of or accession to an international
agreement under subsection (2), such international agreement shall be binding
on the Republic and shall form part of the law of the Republic, provided Parliament
expressly so provides and such agreement is not inconsistent with this Constitution. '0These two provisions not only bring about substantial changes to the
pre-Interim Constitution position, but also create a number of uncertainties regarding the present position.

56. For a view that the 1994 elections introduced a "new" state through a process akin to a
change from colonial rule, see Ziyad Motala, Under InternationalLaw, Does the New Order in
South Africa Assume the Obligationsand Responsibilitiesof the Apartheid Order?An Argument for
Realism over Formalism, 30 COMP. & INT'L L. OF. S. AFR. 287 (1997).
57. A possible justification for the inclusion of this clause may be to enable the government
elected in 1994, by means of its parliamentary majority, to abrogate treaties containing aspects of
apartheid or having secret military agreements (such as with the Republic of China and Israel) that
the new government may be opposed to on ideological grounds. See Olivier, supra note 38, at 4.
58. See NEVILLE BOTHA, InternationalLaw and the South African Interim Constitution,1994
SA PUBLIEKREG/PUBLIC LAW (SAPR/PL) 245, 255.
59. Section 82(l)(i) assigns these tasks to the president, but in practice negotiations are undertaken
by officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs, while the task of signing international agreements
is usually delegated to ambassadors or ministers.
60. S.AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 231(2). Dugard has termed the procedure envisaged in section
231(2) "international ratification" and the section 231(3) procedure in terms of which international
agreements are incorporated into municipal law-'"constitutional ratification." See JOHN DUGARD,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 350 (1994).
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Before the Interim Constitution was implemented, the executive had the power
to enter into and ratify international agreements, while legislation was needed
to give such agreements municipal application. In terms of the Interim Constitution, the role of Parliament is augmented so that it is also involved in terms of
section 231(2) in the ratification of or accession to international agreements.6 1
However, it is not clear whether Parliament is merely competent or obliged to
agree to the ratification of or accession to all international agreements. Support
has been expressed for the view that section 231(2) should not be interpreted as
requiring that all international agreements should serve before Parliament before
they can bind the Republic, especially in view of the heavy workload that will
be placed on Parliament if pro forma agreements and agreements of a technical
or informal nature6 2 also have to be subjected to this procedure. 63 The view has
been expressed that parliamentary agreement will be required only where an
international agreement requires accession or ratification to bring it into force
on the international plane ("international ratification"), or where incorporation
64
thereof into municipal law is required ("constitutional ratification").
It is also not clear what procedure of incorporation of an international agreement
into municipal law is envisaged, as section 231(3) only requires that Parliament
must expressly provide that such incorporation is to take place. However, the
general view is that an act of Parliament, which entails a cumbersome procedure,
is not required. Rather, a resolution or endorsement to the effect that the treaty
is incorporated into municipal law and adopted simultaneously with the resolution
effecting the international ratification of the agreement will suffice.65
2. The Final Constitution
The drafters of the Final Constitution have evidently attempted to improve the
formulation of the section dealing with international agreements and to clear up the
uncertainties that resulted from the formulation used in the Interim Constitution. 66
Section 231 of the Final Constitution, consisting of five subsections, deals solely
with this matter.
The succession provision is contained in section 231(5). It provides that the
Republic is bound by international agreements binding on the Republic at the
time when the Final Constitution comes into effect. No provision is made to
enable Parliament to terminate such agreements.
61. This development has been welcomed as a democratization of the treaty-making process.
See Botha, supra note 58, at 255; Olivier, supra note 38, at 1.
62. These are usually referred to as "executive agreements."
63. See Olivier, supra note 38, at 8; Dugard, supra note 52, at 248.
64. See Olivier, supra note 38, at 8. This interpretation is based on the use of the word "competent" in the text and in subsequent practice.
65. See Dugard, supra note 52, at 250; Botha, supra note 58, at 255.
66. This is especially noticeable if the text of the Final Constitution is compared with that of
the Working Draft of the New Constitution, published for comment by the Constitutional Assembly
on November 22, 1995.
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Section 231 (1) clearly states that the negotiating and signing of
all international
67
agreements is the responsibility of the "national executive."
Section 231(2) deals with the ratification of international agreements on the
international plane. It provides that an international agreement will be binding
on the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (respectively, the lower and
upper houses of Parliament), unless it is one of the agreements referred to in
section 231(3).
Section 231(3) then states that in cases of four kinds of international
agreements-namely of a "technical, administrative or executive nature, or an
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into
by the national executive' '-the Republic will be bound without the approval of
the two houses of Parliament. However, such agreements must be tabled in the
respective houses "within a reasonable time." 6
The clear formulation of sections 231(2) and 231(3) effectively eradicates
uncertainties created by section 231(2) of the Interim Constitution regarding
questions whether parliamentary agreement to ratification of or accession to international agreements is obligatory, and whether all agreements should be subjected
to this procedure. Apart from clearly stipulating the procedures to be followed,
the clear enunciation of the four classes of international agreements for which
Parliamentary approval are not required, is also to be welcomed.69
Section 231(4) deals with the incorporation of international agreements into
South African law, and provides as a general rule that an agreement becomes
law in the Republic when so enacted by national legislation. However, it further
provides that a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved
by Parliament70 is incorporated automatically into South African law, unless it
is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament. Enabling legislation
is therefore not needed in the case of self-executing agreements. This provision
corresponds to the general international definition of a self-executing international
agreement, namely that it is an agreement of which the provisions are automatically and without any formal or specific act of incorporation, part of the domestic
law of a state and as such enforceable by the municipal courts. 7'
While this definition may at first glance appear clear, it has not yet been
established what characteristics identify a self-executing provision/agreement in
67. This formulation, which makes no reference to the role of the President, is preferable to
that of the Interim Constitution as it more accurately reflects practical realities.
68. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 231(3).
69. On the other hand, it may be argued that the definition of the four classes of agreements
for which Parliamentary approval is not required is inadequate and may create new uncertainties.
A provisional Manual on Executive Acts, published by the Office of the President in February 1997,
provides some guidelines as to the distinction between these categories.
70. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 231(2).
71. See CLIVE PARRY ET AL., PARRY AND GRANT: ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 (1982).
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South African law.72 It has been suggested that the intent of an international
agreement should be the determining factor in establishing whether it is selfexecuting.7 a While the courts will have the final say in this matter in South
Africa, it has been suggested that extradition agreements may form a category
of self-executing agreements. 74 The Extradition Act7 5 obliges the Minister of
Justice to "as soon as practicable after Parliament has agreed to the ratification
of, or accession to, or amendment or revocation of an agreement. . .[to] give
notice thereof in the Government Gazette. 7 6 It follows that once Parliament
has ratified an extradition agreement in terms of section 231(2) of the Final
Constitution, all that is required by the Act is that notification be given in the
Government Gazette. As ratification and notification are not considered legislative
acts in terms of South African law, it appears that the Extradition Act provides
a non-legislative process of incorporation for extradition agreements. Consequently, according to this line of argument, extradition agreements will constitute
an exception to the requirement of enactment into domestic law by legislation
and can therefore be classified as self-executing in terms of section 231(4) of
the Final Constitution.
In view of the clear conditions set in section 231(3) of the Interim Constitution
for the incorporation of international agreements, it is clear that no provision
is made therein for the automatic incorporation of self-executing provisions of
agreements into South African law. Despite the present uncertainties regarding
the nature of self-executing agreements, the express provision made in this regard
in the Final Constitution is to be welcomed as it constitutes a speedier way of
incorporating self-executing agreements and provisions of a self-executing nature
into South African law.
Because the Republic can be bound by the four classes of agreements mentioned
in section 231(3) without the need of parliamentary approval, and because the
condition for a self-executing provision or agreement to be incorporated into
South African law in terms of subsection 231(4) is parliamentary approval, it
follows logically that agreements, or provisions thereof, of a technical, administrative, or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require ratification
or accession, cannot be self-executing.
The clear and practical approach regarding international agreements followed in the Final Constitution is an improvement on that of the Interim
Constitution. The objections that have been raised against the Interim Constitution's provisions have been addressed, while the continued parliamentary
72. Self-executing agreements remain a difficult and controversial concept even in the jurisprudence of the United States. See Alona E. Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of
America, 30 BRIT. YB. OF INT'L L. 178, 194 (1953).

73. See

PARRY ET AL.,

supra note 71, at 362.

74. Office of the Chief State Law Adviser (International Law), Opinion 258, Aug. 14, 1998.
75. Act No. 67 of 1962 [hereinafter Extradition Act].
76. Extradition Act § 2(3)(ter).
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involvement in international and constitutional ratification confirms the democratic nature of the Constitution.
C. OTHER REFERENCES PERTAINING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. The Interim Constitution
a. Section 35(1): The Interpretation Clause
The elevation of international law to a central position in the South African
legal order is confirmed by several other provisions of the Interim Constitution.
Section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution, which forms part of chapter 5 on
fundamental rights, deals with the role of international law in the interpretation
of such rights:
In interpreting the provisions of this chapter a court of law shall promote the values
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall,
where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of
the rights entrenched in this chapter and may have regard to comparable foreign case
law.
It is clear from this formulation that any court of law, not only the Constitutional
Court, is empowered to interpret the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, and the applicability of international law. The courts also have no option
but to promote democratic values and apply the norms of public international
law, on the condition that such norms are applicable.77
The question thus arises as to the scope of the directive that a court of law
shall, "where applicable," have regard to "public international law applicable
to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter." With regard to the
situations where public international law will apply ("where applicable"), Dugard 8 adopts a very wide interpretation: as the fundamental rights enshrined in
the Interim Constitution are all based on general principles of international law
or provisions of international human rights conventions, "it is difficult to imagine
situations where public international law will not be applicable under 35(1). 79
With regard to which law will be "applicable" in such situations, he then argues
convincingly that as the term "public international law" is used without qualification, all sources of international law identified in article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice will fall within the scope of public international
law that will be applicable to the protection of the fundamental rights identified
in the Interim Constitution. This will include international law contained in general
treaties, custom, general principles of law, the writings of jurists, and the decisions of international and municipal courts. The approach adopted in section
35(1) leads to the conclusion that the courts will also apply public international
77. Botha, supra note 58, at 246.
78. John Dugard, InternationalHuman Rights, RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 171, 193 (David Van Wyk et al. eds., 1994).
79. See also Steenkamp, supra note 30, at 125.
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law contained in general or multilateral treaties to which South Africa may not
be party. 80 In effect, the wide scope of section 35(1) results in the courts being
directed to apply what is generally known as international human rights law in the
interpretation of the fundamental rights provisions of the Interim Constitution. 8'
b. The Human Rights Commission
Two further references are made to public international law in the Interim
Constitution. In chapter 8, dealing with the Human Rights Commission, section
116(2) empowers the Commission to make a report to the relevant national or
provincial legislatures "if the Commission is of the opinion that any proposed
legislation might be contrary to chapter 3 or to norms of international human
rights law which form part of South African law or to other relevant norms of
82
international law."

The Human Rights Commission has as its primary goals the promotion and
protection of fundamental rights among all citizens of the country. The formulation of subsection 116(2) supports the interpretation that subsection 35(1) provides
for norms of international human rights law to be applied in the interpretation
of the fundamental rights provided for in chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution.
c. International Humanitarian Law
Section 227 of the Interim Constitution, dealing with the functions of the
National Defence Force, addresses both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
Section 227(2)(d) provides with regard to the jus ad bellum that the National
Defence Force shall "not breach international customary law binding on the
'' 3
Republic relating to aggression. 8
It has been submitted" that the formulation of "customary international law"
is wide enough to include the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of
the Charter of the United Nations and the General Assembly's Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression. 85 It follows that provisions of treaties and resolutions

of international organizations that became part of customary international humanitarian law by means of opinio iuris and state practice will be binding on the

80. This interpretation issupported by the following remark by Judge Chaskalson in S. v. Makwanyane andAnother, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), when the Constitutional Court had to pronounce whether
or not the death penalty was constitutional: "In the context of section 35(1), public international law
would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be used as tools of interpretation.
International agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a framework within
which Chapter 3 can be evaluated and understood." Id.
81. See Botha, supra note 58, at 246. An interesting and convincing argument is made that the
scope of section 35(1) is wider than that of section 231, where a qualified approach to the application
of international law norms is followed, and that the provisions of section 231 are subordinate to the
specific provisions of section 35(1). See id.
82. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 116(2).
83. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 227(2)(d).
84. See Dugard, supra note 52, at 243-44.
85. Resolution 3314 (XXIX), Dec. 14, 1974.
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Republic. From the provision contained in section 231(4) of the Interim Constitution, it is clear that to be binding on the Republic, such rules of international
humanitarian law should also not be inconsistent with the Interim Constitution
or a parliamentary act. However, in view of the strong emphasis on international
human rights standards in the Interim Constitution, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where customary international humanitarian law would not be binding
on the Republic. No express reference is made to provisions of treaties that have
not yet been accepted as part of customary international law, as is the case in
section 227(2)(e).
Section 227(2)(e) deals with the ius in bello. It directs the National Defence
Force to, in the case of armed conflict, "comply with its obligations under
international customary law and treaties binding on the Republic." The reference
to treaties in this section extends the scope of international humanitarian law
applicable on armed conflicts both to treaties to which South Africa has already
become a party, and to those which they may become a party in future. s6
Section 226(7) deals with the individual responsibilities of soldiers in terms
of, inter alia, international law. It entitles a member of the National Defence
Force to refuse to execute any order if the execution thereof would constitute
an offence or would breach international law on armed conflict binding on the
Republic.
This provision, which covers both customary international humanitarian law
and obligations in terms of treaties, is to be welcomed. It is clearly aimed at
denying Defence Force members accused of executing human rights abuses the
opportunity to raise the defence that they were only following orders, 7 while
also serving as a warning to the authorities issuing orders in times of conflict.
2. The Final Constitution
a. Section 39(1) and Section 233: The Interpretation Clauses
Section 39(1), dealing with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, is clearly
the successor to section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution. It reads as follows:
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
It is submitted that section 35(1)88 of the Interim Constitution has been retained
in essence, save some improvements.
86. See Dugard, supra note 52, at 244.
87. This is a defense often resorted to by past and present members of the defense establishment
in the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is investigating human rights
abuses during the apartheid era. This was also the case in the trial of a number of former senior
officers of the South African Defense Force (as it was known), including a former defense minister,
for alleged human rights abuses.
88. See Dugard, supra note 52, at 242.
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In section 39(1), provision is made for interpretation of the Bill of Rights by
a court of law, and also by a tribunal or a forum. This reformulation is to be
welcomed. It will considerably widen the application of the Bill of Rights, and
consequently international law, to bodies such as administrative and labour tribunals, and also courts presided over by traditional leaders. "Human dignity," a
value that is promoted together with freedom and equality as guiding principles
of the Bill of Rights, 89 has been added as one of the values that must be promoted
in the interpretation of fundamental rights.
The formulation "shall have regard to" has been changed to "must consider."
The reason for this reformulation is not clear. The meaning of "consider" is
given as "look attentively at; contemplate mentally; keep in mind," and that of
"regard" as "take into account." 9 It appears that "regard" is a stronger term
than "consider," and in view of the obvious desire on the part of the constitution
drafters to ensure the prominence of international law, it is difficult to explain
this change of the text. 9' However, as this directive is still of a peremptory
nature, it is submitted that in practice, the reformulation will probably not make
a significant difference.
Of more significance is the omission of the requirement set in section 35(1)
of the Interim Constitution that international law must be "applicable to the
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter," and the reference to" international law" in section 39(1) instead of "public international law," as was the
case in section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution. This is clearly a much wider
formulation that by definition also includes private international law.
It can be argued that this formulation will dispel any uncertainties about the
applicability of any source of international law, and will provide for the applicability of regional international law. This interpretation is strengthened by the formulation of section 39(l)(c). This section provides for "foreign law" to be considered instead of "comparable foreign case law," as was the case in section 35(1)
of the Interim Constitution. This reformulation has opened the way for the courts
to consider sources such as foreign customary law, general legal principles, and
the writings of jurists. As the new South African constitutional system is broadly
based on those of the United States of America and Germany, one can imagine
that the protection of human rights in these countries will be closely scrutinized
by South Africa in the future.
Unlike the Interim Constitution, the Final Constitution also contains a section
relating to the application of international law in the interpretation of legislation.
Section 233 provides that "every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation

89. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) §§ 7(1), 9-10.
90. THE POCKET OxFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGUSH (1984).
91. See Raylene Keightley, Public International Law and the Final Constitution, 12 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 405, 413 (1996) for a viewpoint that supports this interpretation.
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of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. ,92
This clear directive to the courts, as well as its wide formulation of international
law, are to be welcomed. For the first time ever, international law rules will have
an effect on legislative interpretation, which traditionally has been very strict and
formalistic. This traditional approach has in the past been blamed for what was
considered to be a judicial tendency to interpret legislation too narrowly, resulting
in favoring the executive rather than the individual, 93 which may well be an explanation for the introduction of this measure. The formulation "any legislation" is sufficiently wide to include not only parliamentary legislation but also legislation by
provincial authorities. 94 Section 233 also clearly limits the application of international law in the interpretation of legislation to courts of law.95
b. International Humanitarian Law
While the Interim Constitution makes specific provision for the application of
international law to the National Defence Force, chapter 11 of the Final Constitution (dealing with the security services) directs that international law would apply
to all the Republic's security services. Section 198 deals with the principles
governing national security in the Republic; the third principle requires that the
pursuance of national security be in compliance with the law, including international law. Section 199(5) requires that the security services "must act, and must
teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution
and the law, including customary international law and international agreements
binding on the Republic." Section 199(1) identifies the security services as "a
and any intelligence services estabsingle defence force, a single police service
96
lished in terms of the Constitution."
In view of the past involvement of the security services in enforcing apartheid
laws, this new direction is to be welcomed. It would ensure that the security
92. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 233.
93. See, e.g., H. CORDER, JUDGES AT WORK: THE ROLE AND ATTITUDES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
APPELLATE JUDICIARY 1910-50 (1984); A.E. VAN BLERK, JUDGE AND BE JUDGED (1988); John
Dugard, Should Judges Resign? A Reply to Professor Wacks, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1984); David
Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges and Ourselves II, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 533 (1984); Raymond Wacks,
Judges and Injustice, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 266 (1984).
94. That a clear distinction is made in the Final Constitution between provincial legislation and
the by-laws of local authorities is clear from a comparison between section 104(l)(b), dealing with
provincial legislative authority, and section 156(2), dealing with the powers and functions of municipalities, as local authorities are known in South Africa. The by-laws of municipalities are not considered legislation.
95. Section 167 defines courts of law as the following: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme
Court of Appeal, the High Courts (including any High Court of Appeal that may be established by
legislation) the Magistrates' Courts, and any other court of a status similar to either the High Courts
or the Magistrates' Courts that may be established by legislation.
96. Apart from the police and military intelligence services, there are presently two intelligence
services, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) that deals with internal matters, and the South
African Secret Service (SASS) that deals with foreign intelligence.
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services would not in the future be obliged to breach internationally recognized
principles in the name of national security. The formulation of section 199(5) is
similar to that of section 227(2)(c) of the Interim Constitution in terms of the
scope of applicable international law. The directive that members of the security
services should receive training in this regard is also to be welcomed.97
The defence force98 is the only institution in the Republic that has been assigned
a military role. 99 Although no mention of armed conflict is made in section 199(5),
this section serves to make the rules and obligations of the ius in bello applicable
to the conduct of the National Defence Force and its members.
Section 199(6) directs that no member of any security service may obey a
manifestly illegal order. In view of the clear directive that members of the security
forces are to be subjected to international law, it follows that they also may not
obey orders that would be illegal in terms of international law. While it can be
welcomed that this measure is being made applicable on members of all security
services, it is not clear why no specific reference was made to international law
in this section.
Section 200(2) deals with the ius ad bellum and provides that the primary
object of the defence force is "to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial
integrity and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles
of international law regulating the use of force. "' 00
A new provision relating to international law in the Final Constitution, which
was not found in the Interim Constitution, deals with states of emergency. Section
37(4) provides that in case of the declaration of a state of emergency, any legislation enacted as a result thereof may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the
extent that it is consistent with the Republic's obligations under international law
applicable to states of emergency.
D.

DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INDIVIDUALS

Botha comes to the conclusion that the general provisions regarding the incorporation of international law that are contained in section 231 of the Interim Constitu97. See C.J. Botha, Leashing the Dogs of War: The South African NationalDefence Force Under
the New Constitution, 1993-1994 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L 137, 145-46 for a plea to introduce such a
measure in the Final Constitution.
98. While the Interim Constitution refers to the "National Defence Force," and this term replaced
the previous term "South African Defence Force," the Final Constitution only makes mention of
"the defence force."
99. CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 199(2). The tasks of the South African National
Police Service are identified in section 205(3) as the prevention, combating, and investigation of
crime; the maintenance of public order; upholding and enforcing the law; and protecting and securing
inhabitants of the Republic and their property.
100. It is not clear why the term "principles of international law" has been preferred instead of
the term "international customary law," as used elsewhere in the Final Constitution and in section
227(2)(d) of the Interim Constitution. While this formulation will probably not make much difference
in practice, it is submitted that reference should also have been made to South Africa's treaty obligations in this regard.
VOL. 33, NO. 1

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA

67

tion are subordinate to the specific provisions of section 35. 0 State sovereignty,
a norm of general public international law that is usually applied as an excuse
for the toleration of human rights abuses by states, is incorporated into South
African municipal law by section 231. It follows that the doctrine of state sovereignty cannot be applied to exclude the application of the norms of international
human rights law in terms of section 35(1). The same line of argument could
be followed regarding sections 232 and 39(1) of the Final Constitution.
It has already been pointed out that the human rights provisions in both the
Interim and Final Constitutions are largely based on universal human rights standards. The individual is enabled in this way to seek protection in terms of international human rights norms.' 0 2 While international human rights law is aimed at
the protection of the individual, the individual is not accorded the status of a
consequently, individual claims have to be
subject of public international law;
10 3
made in terms of municipal law.
Regarding the extent to which individuals can rely directly on the provisions
of international agreements, the general rule is that this will depend on a state's
constitutional provisions.'04 It follows that individuals will be able to claim protection before the South African courts in terms of the provisions of international
agreements that have been incorporated into South African municipal law once
the requirements set for constitutional ratification in the Interim and Final Constitutions have been met. Provisions of international agreements that have been
accepted as international human rights law, and have been incorporated into
South African law by means of the Bills of Rights of the respective constitutions,
will also be available to individuals.

E.

THE POSITION OF THE PROVINCES WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

Before the implementation of the Interim Constitution, the Republic of South
Africa consisted of four provinces, two of which, the Transvaal and Orange Free
State, were former Boer republics, while the other two, Natal and the Cape Province, were under British administration before the country's unification in 1910.
These provinces had no original powers and acted as mere administrative agents
for the central government. During the negotiations for the Interim Constitution,
the nature and scope of provincial powers were among the most contentious issues.
The ANC, smelling victory at the polls, wished to centralize power, while the NP
and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and some other smaller parties took strong federalist lines. The eventual compromise gave rise to much debate on the level ofprovincial autonomy guaranteed by the Interim Constitution. During the negotiations for
101. See Botha, supra note 58, at 248.
102. See id. at 248-49 (for the international instruments that form the basis of modern international
human rights law).
103. See id.
104. See Erasmus, supra note 1, at 105.
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the Final Constitution, this issue was again the subject of intense negotiations and
serious differences between the ANC and NP (the IFP did not take part in the negotiations) before a compromise text regarding provincial competence could be
found. 10 5 The Interim Constitution authorized the establishment of nine
prov07
inces,106 an arrangement that was confirmed in the Final Constitution. 1
Since the establishment of the new provinces, a practice has developed that
provincial premiers enter into "international agreements" on behalf of the provinces with foreign states or federal units or regions of such states. These
agreements are mainly aimed at attracting investment or development aid.
1. The Interim Constitution
Section 82(1)(i) provides that only the president, as head of state, has the power
to negotiate and sign international agreements. This power may be delegated,
but only to one or more cabinet ministers.
It is clear from section 231 that only the state, through the organs of central
government, is entitled to take up rights and obligations in terms of international
law. The power to agree to ratification or accession of international agreements,
signed and negotiated in terms of section 82(1)(i), is conferred on Parliament
by section 231(2). Section 231(3) provides that such agreements shall bind the
Republic and, subject to express provision by Parliament, form part of South
African law. Therefore, no provision is made for an entity other than the state
as represented by the President to become party to international agreements.
Section 126(1) dealing with the legislative competence of provinces, provides
that a provincial legislature has concurrent competence with Parliament to make
laws for the province with regard to matters that fall within the functional areas
specified in Schedule 6. The functional areas covered by Schedule 6 do not include
the conduct of foreign affairs.
2. The Final Constitution
Section 104(1) of the Final Constitution confers on a provincial legislature the
power to pass legislation with regard to matters within the functional areas listed in
its Schedules 4 (areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence)
and 5 (areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence), as well as with regard
to any matter outside these functional areas that is expressly assigned to the province
105. One of the reasons for the Constitutional Court's decision to refuse to certify the text of the
Final Constitution, and to refer it back to the Constitutional Assembly, was its finding that the text
did not meet the requirement set forth in Constitutional Principle 18, which required that the powers
allotted to provincial governments in terms of the Interim Constitution should not be substantially
diminished in the Final Constitution.
106. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 124. The provinces are: Eastern Cape, Eastern Transvaal (renamed
Mpumalanga), Kwazulu-Natal, Northern Cape, Northern Transvaal (renamed Northern Province),
North-West, Orange Free State (renamed Free State), Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (renamed
Gauteng), and Western Cape.
107. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 103.
VOL. 33, NO. 1

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA

69

by national legislation. As was the case with the Interim Constitution, no provision
is made for the conduct of foreign relations by the provinces. Section 231 (1) states
unequivocally that the negotiating and signing of all international agreements is
the responsibility of the national executive. Section 231(2) requires approval of an
international agreement by both the National Assembly and the National Council
of Provinces in order for it to bind the Republic, except for certain categories of
agreements listed in subsection (3). These categories of international agreements
are exempted from the requirement that approval is necessary for the Republic to
be bound on the international plane, and the only requirement is that such agreements have to be tabled in the Assembly and Council within a reasonable time.
As previously noted, for international agreements to be incorporated into South
African municipal law, enactment by national legislation is required in terms of
section 231(4). An exception to this requirement exists in the case of self-executing
provisions of agreements that have received parliamentary approval, which are
directly incorporated without the need for enabling legislation unless they are
inconsistent with the Constitution or a parliamentary act. It follows that, as in
the case of the Interim Constitution, only the organs of central government are
entitled to enter into international agreements and thereby create rights and obligations for the state. Thus, the provinces are not subjects of international law, and
are not able to enter into agreements governed by international law. However,
nothing prevents them from entering into contracts with foreign entities regarding
matters falling within the ambit of the functional areas listed in the respective
schedules. It should be kept in mind that in both the Interim and the Final Constitutions provision is made for the central government to delegate legislative and
executive authority to the provinces in areas other than the functional areas listed
in the respective schedules.' 08
As pointed out, section 233 of the Final Constitution expressly provides that
all legislation, including legislation by the provinces, has to be interpreted in a
way consistent with international law. While no such provision is found in the
Interim Constitution, the presumption that parliament did not intend to legislate
contrary to international law will still be applicable to provincial legislation interpreted in terms of the Interim Constitution.
F.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The Constitutional Court is the linchpin of the new constitutional dispensation.
It has unprecedented powers as the independent protector of the constitution and
the rule of law. The Interim Constitution'0 9 provides that it is the court of final
instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection, and enforcement

108. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. §§ 126, 144; CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) §§ 104,
125.
109. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 98(2).
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of constitutional provisions, and the Final Constitution11 ° provides that it is the
highest court in all constitutional matters.
Save for certain areas where the Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction,11' other courts are also empowered to decide on constitutional matters.' 12
However, the Constitutional Court, as the highest authority on constitutional
matters, is primarily responsible for the development of constitutional jurisprudence in South Africa. It has the task of interpreting the provisions of the Interim
Constitution and the Final Constitution, as well as parliamentary legislation, in
order to establish the scope of application of international law in South African
municipal law. It must interpret the content and scope of the Bill of Rights
provisions in the light of the international human rights instruments on which
they are based. It has to set the guidelines for the interpretation of legislation
consistent with the rules and norms of international law.
The Constitutional Court consists of a president and ten other judges. 3 The
procedure for appointing judges has been dealt with in some detail elsewhere. 114
In short, the Interim Constitution provides that the (national) president appoints
the president of the Constitutional Court' as well as four judges from among
judges serving on the Supreme Court bench, in consultation with the cabinet and
the chiefjustice.' 16 The remaining six judges are appointed by the national president from among a list of recommendations made by the Judicial Services Commission. "7 Four of these must be drawn from the pool of lawyers (including
advocates, attorneys, and legal academicians), 18 while the remaining two can
be experts in constitutional law "by reason of his or her training and experience."' 1 9 They must be South African
citizens 120 and are appointed for a non12
1
years.
seven
of
renewable term
110. See CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 167(3)(a).
111. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 98; CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. § 167(4).
112. It falls outside the scope of this discussion to give a detailed account of the jurisdiction on
constitutional matters of courts other than the Constitutional Court, or of the court structure in South
Africa. For a discussion of this issue in terms of the Interim Constitution, see Sonnekus, supra note
30, at 670-80; see supra note 49 for a discussion in terms of the Final Constitution.
113. Section 167(1) of the Final Constitution makes provision for the position of Deputy President
to be filled by one of the other judges.
114. See Sonnekus, supra note 30, at 672-74; Steenkamp, supra note 30, at 121-22.
115. S.AFR. INTERIM. CONST. § 97(2). In terms of section 99(2)(c)(i), such person has to be an
advocate, attorney, or university law lecturer.
116. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 99(3).
117. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 99(5)(a).
118. See S. AFR. INTERIM CoNsT. §§ 99(2), 99(4).
119. S.AFR. INTERIM CONST. § 99(2)(c)(ii).
120. This qualification is probably aimed at securing the development of a "homegrown" constitutional jurisprudence that will take note of developments in constitutional jurisprudence in foreign countries in line with the constitutional directions in this regard, but without being unduly influenced. The
same qualification is not set forjudicial officers of other courts in either the Interim or Final Constitution.
121. The present bench of the Constitutional Court was appointed in 1994 and will therefore serve
until 2001. In the Final Constitution, the procedures for appointment have been somewhat amended.
The (national) president appoints the president and deputy president of the court after consultation
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This procedure of appointment is a marked departure from established practice,
whereby judges of the appellate division have been appointed exclusively from
the ranks of Supreme Court judges who in turn have been appointed from the
ranks of senior advocates. The new procedure has resulted in an infusion of
"new blood," notably from the academic world, to the Constitutional Court.122
G.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION

The new constitutional dispensation introduced with the implementation of the
Interim Constitution represents a fundamental break with the South African legal
tradition. It will have an unprecedented impact on legal practice and legal training
in the country. No sphere of law will be left untouched.
Fundamental rights are now part and parcel of the South African legal system.
They do not form a separate compartment of the law that remains the domain
of only specialist practitioners and academicians.
While customary international law was always in principle considered to be
part of South African municipal law, it never had a prominent place in the legal
tradition of South Africa while its application has also been curtailed by exceptions

with the Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly.
CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. APR. (1996) § 174(3). The nine remaining judges are appointed by the
(national) president, after consulting the president of the Constitutional Court, from a list nominees
prepared by the Judicial Service Commission. See CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 174(4)(a).
At all times, at least four judges must be persons who were serving judges at the time of their
appointment to the Constitutional Court. See CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 174(4)(c).
For the remaining judges, the only condition set is that they must be "appropriately qualified." See
CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AFR. (1996) § 174(1). All judges of the Constitutional Court must also
be South African citizens. See CONST. OF THE REP. OF S. AnR. (1996) § 174(1). They are appointed
for a non-renewable term of twelve years, but must retire by the age of seventy. See CONST. OF
THE REP. OF S. AFt. (1996) § 176(1).
122. The appointment as president of the Constitutional Court of Arthur Chaskalson, a senior
advocate specializing in human rights law who has been involved in numerous political trials over
the past three decades, has been widely welcomed. See A. Hadland, Chaskalson to Help Breathe
Life into the Constitution, Bus. DAY, June 8, 1994, at 10; M. Gevisser, Nothing but Praisefor
Chaskalson, WKLY. MAIL & GUARDIAN, June 10, 1994, at 3; M. Morris, InspirationalLawyer,
SOWETAN, June 10, 1994, at 9. The other members of the Constitutional Court bench include four
Supreme Court judges, a judge of appeal, three law lecturers, and two advocates. Four of the judges,
including one of two women appointed, are black. However, the appointment of the eleven judges
was not without controversy. Questions were raised about whether the Court could exercise the
desired degree of independence because a number of the judges were known to be sympathizers of
and advisors to the African National Congress (ANC). See Steven Friedman, Constitutional Court
Looks Like an ANC Coup, Bus. DAY, Nov. 14, 1994, at 10. Despite these initial misgivings, the
court has subsequently proved its credibility and independence and is now enjoying a large measure
of public acceptance. See H. Grange, Proving that It's Independent, THE STAR, Dec. 27, 1995, at
11. However, criticism that political bias has influenced the court has been made about the politically
sensitive case, In re: The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (SA), that
dealt with the question of whether a right to education based on a common language, culture, or
religion in a publicly-funded school exists in terms of the Interim Constitution. See P.J. Visser,
Public Schools Based on a Common Language, Culture or Religion not ConstitutionallySanctioned,
1997 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REO (THRHR) 339.
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to this general rule. Since the end of World War II, South Africa was increasingly
at odds with international sentiment and the developing international human rights
law due to implementation of its apartheid policy. As a result of increasing
international opposition to this policy in which international fora like the United
Nations played an important role, 23 official attitudes towards international law
became increasingly suspicious.124 South Africa's international isolation effected
a siege mentality among the ruling white minority, which in turn resulted in a
lack of interest in and understanding of international law.
As a result, public international law became a much-neglected branch of law
in South Africa. It was rarely the subject of litigation and when it was, the
judiciary often displayed a lack of comprehension of the principles of international
law. 125 The courts, under the influence of the prevailing doctrine of legal positivism, were also unwilling to apply international
human rights principles in order
126
to soften the impact of apartheid legislation.
Public international law has also been relegated to a secondary role in the field
of legal training. It was a compulsory subject at only eight of South Africa's
twenty-one law faculties, and an optional one at the other thirteen. 127 As an
optional subject, it has traditionally not been popular, probably because of a
widespread belief that it is not a branch of law of real relevance to legal practice. 121
The unprecedented status that public international law has gained as a result
of the constitutional changes in South Africa presents great challenges and opportunities to the legal fraternity. Judges, practitioners, and academicians will have
to ground themselves in the principles of international law, especially international
human rights law, and ensure that they keep up to date with developments
in
29
these fields in South Africa as well as in foreign jurisdictions. 1
123. For an overview of UN steps against South Africa, see Jacqueline Cassette, United Nations
Observer Mission in South Africa: a Significant Event, 1992-1993 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
124. The previous foreign minister, Mr. R.F. Botha, often related that a suggestion in his maiden
speech to Parliament in 1970-that South Africa should reconsider its decision not to support the
adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights-was met with open hostility from many
members of his own party.
125. See Neville Botha, The Coming ofAge ofPublic InternationalLaw in South Africa, 1992-1993
S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 38 and the judgments discussed. See also John Dugard, The South African
Judiciary and InternationalLaw in the Apartheid Era, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM RTS. 110 (1998).
126. See John Dugard, The Role of InternationalLaw in Interpreting the Bill of Rights, 1994 S.
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 208, 210.
127. Kevin Ferguson-Brown, Teaching Public InternationalLaw in South Africa: Problems and
Possibilities, 27 COMP. INT'L L. OF S. AFR. 52 (1994).
128. When the author was a final-year LL.B. student at the University of Stellenbosch in 1984,
only five out of a total of sixty-five students chose to follow international law as an optional subject.
129. A clear analysis has been made in certain judgments by both the Constitutional Court and
the Supreme Court about the role accorded to international law by means of section 35 of the Interim
Constitution. Other judgments, however, are characterized by incorrect interpretations of section
35 and an inability to distinguish between international law, the consideration of which is peremptory
in terms of section 35, and foreign case law, the consideration of which is optional. The reason for
this confusion is more likely than not South Africa's history of academic neglect of international
law, a situation that will hopefully improve with a stronger academic focus on this field of law. See
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Access to international sources and foreign material will therefore be essential.
However, with a weakening South African currency, acquisition of foreign publications and travel abroad are becoming prohibitively expensive.
In this regard, recent donations by the Canadian and Norwegian governments
to the Constitutional Court to develop its library and research facilities are of
great value. The Department of Foreign Affairs, through its missions to the
United Nations and its Multilateral Documentation Centre, can assist the legal
profession in overcoming the problem of gaining access to primary international
law sources such as United Nations documents and travaux preparatoires.The
availability of sources on the Internet will also make research in international
law much easier.
International law, being by definition the most international branch of law,
cannot only be studied in the relative isolation of South Africa. Conscious efforts
should be made to enable deserving South African students to do postgraduate
studies in international law and human rights law at universities abroad. Foreign
governments could enhance the development of a human rights culture in South
Africa by providing bursaries to South African students for such studies.
On the positive side, interest in international law, and especially international
human rights law, has markedly increased in South Africa in recent years. Several
human rights institutes, which have been founded as part of law faculties, are
funding research, hosting conferences and seminars, and running human rights
awareness programmes. New publications like The South African Journal on
Human Rights (1985) and South African Public Law (1986) have joined the South
African Yearbook of InternationalLaw and Comparative and InternationalLaw
of South Africa. Articles on international law and human rights law are now also
appearing regularly in other law journals.
Several universities are now offering LL.M. degrees with a focus on international law, constitutional law, and human rights, 30 and the majority of the universities are now offering international law as a compulsory subject for graduate
studies. A welcome development is a new focus on human rights within an African
context, with enhanced contact among South African and African universities,
also Neville Botha, InternationalLaw in the ConstitutionalCourt, 1995 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 222.
The Appellate Division has also been criticized for its application of international law. See John
Dugard, Abduction: Does the Appellate Division Care About InternationalLaw?, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 326 (1996).
130. To name some examples, the University of Pretoria is offering an LL.M. course in international law, as well as one focusing on constitutional practice and human rights. The University of
South Africa is offering LL.M. courses on advanced public law, international economic law, human
rights law, and constitutional law. The three universities in the Cape Town region-the University
of Stellenbosch, the University of the Western Cape, and the University of Cape Town-have combined efforts and are offering an LL.M. focused on the impact that constitutional developments will
have on all fields of law in the country. The University of the Witwatersrand has introduced a course
to acquaint legal practitioners with the impact that the introduction of a constitutional system will
have on legal practice. See also Hercules Booysen, InternationalLaw as a University Course, 1996
S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 147.
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as well as members of the legal profession. ' 3' Being a leading country in Africa,
South Africa should take due cognizance of African perspectives on international
law and the continent's problems in this field.
A further welcome development was the recent establishment of a South African
branch of the International Law Association, which will host an annual conference
on developments in the field of international law.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The introduction of the Interim Constitution in 1994 established a completely
new legal order in the country. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty was
abandoned in favor of a constitutional system.
Under parliamentary sovereignty, the courts had no choice but to interpret
and enforce the laws of parliament, whether such laws were just or not. This
system of supremacy of parliament enabled the National Party government, since
coming to power in 1948, to systematically restrict the application of human
rights norms, undermining the natural law philosophy of the country's RomanDutch legal tradition.1 32 The government's policy of racial discrimination resulted
in international isolation of the country, and as a result it was effectively cut off
from developments in the fields of international law and human rights law.
The introduction of a constitutional system has effected a clear break with the
past. The Bills of Rights of both the Interim and Final Constitutions are virtual
catalogues of universally accepted human rights norms and standards. By their
conscious efforts, the drafters of the constitutions have assigned a central place
to public international law. From being a relegated and neglected branch of law,
public international law has become a pillar of the new constitutional system.
The relationship between international law and South African municipal law is
now more clearly defined than ever before. No field of law will be left untouched
by the norms and standards of public international law and international human
rights law.
The rightful place that the norms and standards of international law have been
accorded in South African law ensure that it will play an important role in upholding and protecting South Africa's fledging democracy. Furthermore, its new
constitutional system enables South Africa to make an important contribution to
the development of international law, and play the leading and respected role in
the international community that the country deserves.

131. The annual Southern African Moot Court Competition, held since 1992, has provided an
excellent opportunity for contact between South African law students and their counterparts from
other African countries. Students and lecturers from more than thirty universities in South Africa,
Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Kenya, Swaziland, Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
take part in this event, which concentrates on human rights problems within a Southern African
context.
132. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 397 (1978).
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